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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 According to neoliberal institutionalism, sovereign states create centralized international 
organizations to limit information asymmetries, monitor compliance, and ensure the credibility of 
commitments to agreed-upon policies – in short, to minimize transaction costs in a world where the 
Coase theorem does not apply. Neoliberal institutionalism can thus help explain the delegation of 
powers to supranational bodies like the European Commission (‘Commission’) or the European 
Central Bank (‘ECB’). Yet, what we observe in the Eurozone in 2010-2013 is the emergence of a 
number of influential institutions of decentralized bargaining, such as the “Merkozy duumvirate” 
and the “Frankfurt Group”, whose creation reversed the logic of supranational delegation. To 
understand the causes and the consequences of these apparently anomalous institutions we develop 
a model of incomplete contracts. We demonstrate that, inasmuch as they receive monopolistic 
powers, centralized international organizations create potential problems of discrimination. 
Decentralized institutions are explained by their role in mitigating these problems.      
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1.	Introduction	
 
 Since 2008 the European Union (‘EU’) is going through one of the most challenging 
economic, political, and institutional crises in its 60 years-long history. In the vast majority of EU 
countries, and for most of the period, macro-economic indicators, the number of corporate 
bankruptcies, and calls for beggar-thy-neighbour policies have all been alarming. To deal with that 
unprecedented situation, European leaders created a number of ad hoc and informal institutions of 
decentralized bargaining, such as the “Merkozy duumvirate” (i.e. the tandem consisting of the 
German Chancellor and the French President) and the “Frankfurt Group” (i.e. the decision-making 
group consisting of the Chief Executive Officers of France, Germany, the Commission, the ECB, 
the Eurogroup, the President of the European Council, and the European commissioner responsible 
for economic and financial affairs). This article seeks to explain the emergence of these institutions 
given that the main theory social scientists currently employ to study international organizations 
(‘IOs’) cannot account for them.   
 
Before going on to present the logic of our argument, two preliminary points are in order. First, our 
definition of “institutions” is game-theoretical. Following Calvert, we define an institution as “an 
equilibrium of behaviour in an underlying game … It must be rational for nearly every individual to 
almost always adhere to the behavioural prescriptions of the institution, given that nearly all other 
individuals are doing so” (Calvert 1995: 60). Note that this definition is not trivial; for example, it 
contrasts with North’s (1990: 3) better known understanding of institutions as humanly devised 
constraints (or “rules of the game”). The definition of “institutions” that we adopt in this paper is 
further discussed in Section 2.  
 
Second, the ad hoc creation of these informal institutions of decentralized bargaining (hereafter 
‘decentralized institutions’) came at a cost. The “duumvirate of Germany and France” and the “F-
group” (The Economist 04/11/2011) threatened to undermine the emerging spirit of the Treaty of 
Lisbon. The self-appointment of a few leaders as “commanders-in-chief” of the Eurozone 
aggravated the EU’s democratic deficit, and undermined faith in the idea that the EU is a 
“community of law”. Leftist newspapers run titles such as “The Great Putsch: Welcome to Non-
Democratic Europe” (Roarmag.org 2011) or “The Merkozy decoy” (L’ Humanité 01/02/2012). 
Right-wing ones wrote about “Europe’s hit squad: If you thought the EU couldn’t get any less 
democratic, meet the Frankfurt Group” (The Spectator 12/11/2011) and “Euro-globalization: The 
Merkozy System in Disrepair” (NationsPresse 22/10/2011). Even the mainstream press denounced 
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the absence of “firm legal foundations” of these institutions, which raises “serious constitutional 
problems” (Der Spiegel 16/12/2011; see also Habermas 2011). And outside the EU, the operation of 
these ad hoc institutions strengthened critics (e.g. Russia Today 11/11/2011). Given the costs 
illustrated above, of course, we must try to discover the benefits which made the decentralized 
institutions worth creating.  
 
Our starting point is a striking dissonance between theory and the empirical record. According to 
the dominant lens used today to analyze international organizations (‘IOs’), neoliberal 
institutionalism (‘NI’), institutions exist because they mitigate certain informational problems 
inherent in international bargaining and decentralized bargaining (Keohane 1984; Milner and 
Moravcsik 2009; Broz et al. 2009; for an application to the EU, Pollack 2003). It follows that such 
highly institutionalized setups as the EU should be necessary and possibly sufficient to promote 
inter-governmental cooperation on all core matters covered by the corresponding treaties, and 
perhaps also various germane ones. IOs are a solution, and perhaps the solution; they should not be 
a problem. Yet the operation of the EU during the 2009-2013 crisis contrasts sharply with the 
theory. Far from being deemed necessary and sufficient to resolve the problems of the financial, 
economic, and sovereign-growth crisis, the operation of formal institutions of centralized 
bargaining were seen as a problem which had to be urgently resolved. Interestingly, these included 
problems of informational asymmetries and moral hazard generated by the operation of the 
Commission, the Eurogroup, and the ECB.  
 
Among academics, the potentially far-reaching consequences of the new institutions have led to 
numerous comments on their causes, the unfolding of the negotiations which led to their creation, 
and their consequences (see de Witte et al. 2013). One of their aspects which remains to be 
explored, however, concerns their place in, and their implications for, the theory of international 
institutions in general, and European integration in particular. This article starts filling that gap by 
taking a perspective rooted in positive political theory. The questions we are trying to answer are 
the following: admitting that IOs are created to allow states to economize on the costs of their 
transactions, wasn’t that goal adequately served by the Maastricht and Lisbon treaties? How can we 
account theoretically for the puzzling situation where supranational solutions create problems which 
are addressed by reverting to inter-governmentalism, which was supposed to be the original 
problem? Is there any more theory-based and general explanation for the new decentralized 
institutions than the facile assertion that French President Sarkozy was incurably obsessed by 
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upcoming elections or that German chancellor Angela Merkel had the upper hand in all her dealings 
with her European partners?             
 
With these questions in mind, the rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
main definitions of “institutions” that emerge from the literature, and explains why we opt for a 
game-theoretical definition. Section 3 reviews the neo-liberal institutionalist theory of international 
organizations (‘IO theory’), both as originally developed by Robert Keohane and as applied to 
European integration. Section 4 presents a few basic facts about the new ad hoc institutions, 
highlights their interconnection with EMU policies and politics, and argues that IO theory cannot 
account for their creation and functioning. To start thinking where IO theory gets it wrong, Section 
5 turns to an under-explored alternative to IO theory, namely the Coase theorem of decentralized 
bargaining. Section 6 then produces a novel theoretical model about the role of the new ad hoc 
institutions in EMU in particular, and European integration in general, based on the theory of 
incomplete contracts. The intuition behind the model is simple: by giving rational re-election-
minded national governments privileged access to information about each other’s ideal policy 
preferences, decentralized institutions allow them to avoid being discriminated against by 
supranational bureaucrats. This, we argue, is a more plausible explanation for the observed actions 
of numerous actors than extant explanations. Section 7 concludes.   
 
 
2.	Defining	and	explaining	institutions	
 
 Institutions are defined by political scientists in different ways. Following Crawford and 
Ostrom, we can distinguish between two main possible definitions: “institutions-as-equilibria” and 
“institutions-as-rules” (1995: 582). The first one is typically game-theoretical (see Riker 1980, 
Calvert 1995, Schofield 2002), and it posits that institutions are the result of mutual agreements 
between rational actors: in other words, “a regular behavior pattern sustained by mutual 
expectations about the actions that others will take” (Crawford and Ostrom 1995: 583). The second 
definition sees institutions as the “rules of the game in a society” (North 1990: 3; see also Ostrom 
1986, Knight 1992), and it argues that equilibria of behaviour (or “shared strategies”) are only a 
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component of institutions. Another necessary element, according to this view, is the sanction 
associated with improper or unlawful behaviour.1  
 
Between these two definitions, we adopt the former, for two important reasons. First, we assume 
that states are boundedly rational actors (on the concept of bounded rationality see Simon 1972, and 
Gigerenzer and Selten 2002) and we are interested in understanding why they choose particular 
arrangements over (or together with) others. The fact that some arrangements are not crystallized in 
binding rules must not prevent us from analysing them, if they constitute a tool by which their 
members organize their actions and influence the functioning of other institutions. Second, we 
believe that considering institutions as equilibria is the only way to satisfactorily conceptualize 
institutional change. An institution can sometimes take the form of a stable set of written rules. 
However, as rules are often changed through time, our primary interest is in explaining what 
happens between two different set-ups − why and how institutional change happens. To do so, we 
need to turn our attention to the “interstitial creation of informal institutions” (Farrell and Héritier 
2007: 286) that arises when some equilibrium is not sustainable or optimal for all the actors. It is 
through the creation of informal institutions that formal institutions (rules) are then amended. The 
creation of informal institutions is favoured by the incompleteness of contracts, i.e. the fact that the 
rules are “vulnerable to reinterpretation ex post in circumstances that were not initially foreseen” 
(Farrell and Héritier 2007: 289). In an institutional system like the EU, where many rules can be 
changed only via unanimity, all actors tend to use informal institutions to negotiate better 
bargaining positions in future negotiation rounds (see also Farrell and Héritier 2003, Héritier 2007). 
 
Some may say that, if institutions do not necessarily imply the existence of formal rules, it becomes 
difficult to ascertain what is an institution and what is just an ephemeral agreement between two or 
more actors. Calvert, whose definition of institution as “an equilibrium of behaviour in an 
underlying game” we have adopted, clarifies that (1995: 73-74): 
 
“[w]hen [expectations about the behavior and reactions of others] take on a 
particularly clear and concrete form across individuals, when they apply to 
situations that recur over a long period of time, and especially when they involve 
highly variegated and specific expectations about the different roles of different 
                                                 
 
1
 Crawford and Ostrom indicate another possible definition, that they label as “institutions-as-norms”. It is mainly 
adopted by sociologists (see Coleman 1988, Elster 1989), according to whom institutions entail some social reaction to 
what is perceived as a “wrong” behaviour.  
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actors in determining what actions others should take, we often collect these 
expectations and strategies under the heading of institution” (emphasis in the 
original). 
 
Therefore, to have “institutions” we ought to have a “clear and concrete form”, something that 
recurs “over a long period of time”, and, above all, “specific expectations” about how actors that 
form the institution shape the behaviour of other actors. Is this the case for the phenomena we aim 
to analyse in this paper? We deem it is, because ‘Merkozy’ and the ‘Frankfurt Group’ possessed all 
of the three above mentioned characteristics. First, their form was clear. They had regular meeting 
during their existence, and they let the other actors know that they were meeting, deciding, acting. 
Although their form did not rely on formal rules, they were clearly identifiable: both their 
membership and their objectives were unambiguous. Second, they lasted a relevant amount of time. 
In this respect, time must not be measured in absolute terms, but relatively to the amount of events 
that take place in a certain period. By “events”, following Riker’s (1957, 1990) definition, we mean 
definite and “unambiguous” ones. An events is considered unambiguous “when the movers and 
actors of its initial and terminal situations are the same” (Riker 1990: 170).2 Consequently, to be 
meaningfully analysed by social scientists, events must be short and definite: summits, meetings, 
ministerial appointments, and so on. It is therefore easy to note that many of these events took place 
in the period in which these decentralized institutions existed: there were frequent bilateral and 
multilateral meetings, governments resigned and others were appointed, formal and informal 
agreements were agreed on. Third, the institutions shaped specific expectations among their 
members and among non-members as well: all of the events that occurred in that period had a 
particular outcome because the actors that participated in them knew about the existence of (and 
was influenced by) these decentralized institutions, about their preferences, strategies and goals. 
 
 
3.	IO	theory	and	european	integration	
 
 IO theory provides the dominant theoretical framework to interpret and analyse international 
institutions (i.e. rules, organizations, and regimes). Finding its inspiration in the work of economists 
Roland Coase and Oliver Williamson on transaction costs, the theory posits that international 
                                                 
 
2
 According to Riker, focussing on this kind of events is the only way for social scientists to avoid arbitrariness and 
imprecision.  
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agreements can be thought of as economic barter transactions. Just like an economic transaction 
may consist in supplying 20 megawatts of electricity in exchange of 1,000 hours’ worth of legal 
services, so an international agreement consists in one (or more) country agreeing to change some 
policy in exchange for changes by some other country in some of its own policies. Because these 
are barter arrangements, payment may not occur at the exact moment the transaction is agreed. Yet 
a promise to pay in the future may be cheap talk, and this creates a series of problems (e.g. 
becoming locked into a relationship with an untrustworthy partner who is thereby able to extort 
benefits by the other party). Anticipating such problems, the parties will either give up on their 
potential transaction, which leads to Pareto-inefficiency, or create appropriate governance structures 
to mitigate the risks of guile, untrustworthiness, or extortion.        
 
According to neoliberal institutionalists, that economic reasoning has an obvious parallel in 
international relations. Despite the fundamentally anarchic nature of international relations, 
international institutions structure relationships, instil confidence that “payments” will indeed be 
made, and thereby make transactions possible. In other words, they “matter” because they resolve 
problems of asymmetrical information and make commitments credible. In fact, the distinguishing 
characteristic of IO theory is its claim that what matters most in the world of international politics is 
the configuration of information and institutions (i.e. neither, as realists argue, the configuration of 
capabilities, nor, as pure liberals argue, the configuration of state preferences – see Moravcsik 1997: 
513). And the proof of the pudding is in the eating: if international institutions did not matter, then 
sovereign states would not get into the trouble of creating them in the first place. IO theory is thus 
rooted in the idea that, even when actors have common interests, international cooperation may fail. 
This may be due to a number of reasons, such as (1) high incentives to defect (as in the prisoner’s 
dilemma); (2) the non-iterative nature of transactions (as in one-shot games of collaboration, 
including the prisoner’s dilemma played a knowingly finite number of times); (3) the high number 
of actors, which makes mutual monitoring difficult¸ or (4) problems of information asymmetry (as 
in principal-agent models of moral hazard).  
 
Just as in Coase’s and Williamson’s works on transaction costs and the limits of firms, however, the 
real possibility of failure in international relations is not the end of IO theorists’ story. According to 
Keohane, international cooperation is not bound to fail. International institutions reduce the range of 
expected behaviour, limit uncertainty, and spread information widely. This, and the possibility to 
create issue linkages, leads to lessened risks of moral hazard. “The central conclusion is [that] 
international regimes can facilitate cooperation by reducing uncertainty.” (Keohane 1984: 97)  
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Thus, international institutions, organizations, and regimes perform essentially four cooperation-
enhancing tasks. First, they reduce contractual ambiguity by setting standards of behaviour which 
allow all parties to determine whether an actor is violating an agreement. Second, they reduce the 
costs of joint decision-making by routinizing procedures and decisions. Third, institutions such as 
IOs also facilitate cooperation by providing mechanisms for the authoritative resolution of disputes. 
And finally, they provide ways to acquire information on compliance, not only by permitting on-site 
inspections, but even when self-reporting is the starting point of official discussions. Hence, 
“Regimes are important not because they constitute centralized quasi-governments, but because 
they can facilitate agreements, and decentralized enforcement of agreements, among governments.” 
(Keohane 1984: 244) 
      
Although Keohane’s IO theory was illustrated by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
other scholars found it useful to understand EU institutions. Pollack (2003) and, with some 
variations, Moravcsik (1998) and Franchino (2007), set out to understand who does what and why 
in the EU. Applying Keohane’s transaction cost-economizing logic, Pollack argued that national 
governments delegate powers to centralized supranational institutions because these “solve 
problems of incomplete information (by providing policy-relevant information to legislators) and 
credible commitments (by monitoring legislators’ compliance with their agreements and by 
providing independent regulation of powerful economic actors).” (Pollack 2003: 6). Similarly, 
according to Moravcsik, “Delegation and pooling appear to have been employed primarily to 
implement or enforce prior agreements by precommitting governments to greater compromise and 
thus more efficient decision-making.” (Moravcsik 1998: 485-86)    
 
4.	The	puzzle	of	decentralized	institutions	
 
 This section turns to a description of the decentralized institutions that were created in 2011. 
We focus on the two institutions which we deem to be the most important, namely “Merkozy” and 
the “Frankfurt group” (other decentralized institutions that either appeared or were strengthened 
during the Eurozone crisis concern the coordination of northern creditor countries, chiefly Finland, 
Germany, and The Netherlands, and that of southern debtor countries, primarily Italy and Spain). 
Both emerged in 2011 as a way to push for fast and effective solutions to the European sovereign-
debt crisis that had been intensifying since late 2009. The puzzle that they create for IO theory can 
be summarized as follows: why did some countries and representatives of IOs need to establish 
 8
informal and decentralized institutions if there already existed many IOs and institutions that 
allowed them to propose, discuss and adopt the measures they pushed for? Were the existing 
institutions more an obstacle than a means to solve the problems that European leaders faced? If this 
is the case, then current theories of European integration and the role of IOs might need to be 
amended. 
 
“Merkozy” graphically characterizes the tight relationship between German chancellor Angela 
Merkel and former French president Nicolas Sarkozy, who engaged on sustained coordination 
beyond the traditional limits of the Elysée Treaty of 1963. The institution was first named by Dutch 
newspaper De Telegraaf on February 5, 2011 (‘Eurolanden krijgen korset aangemeten’), when it 
became evident that the two political leaders were determined to steer the EU decision-making 
process in the forthcoming months, particularly with regard to the measures to be taken in order to 
solve the European sovereign-debt crisis. The relationship took the form of frequent bilateral 
meetings before and between EU summits, common proposals and press conferences, and even 
joint electoral campaigning. Merkozy conveyed the message that they strongly agreed on the main 
issues on the Eurozone agenda, and that they were determined to see their proposals adopted by all 
Eurozone members. Merkozy was an institution because Sarkozy’s main concern was to preserve 
France’s “triple-A” bond rating by showing himself fully committed to implementing German-like 
austerity measures, while Merkel needed to show that even a traditionally anti-austerity country like 
France agreed with her policies.  
 
Our intention here is not to explore minutely the contingencies that led the two leaders to form such 
a coalition. What is more relevant for us here is that they found it necessary to do so. It goes without 
saying that France and Germany had not the same ultimate goals at the time. However, as 
mentioned above, they both deemed that the “duumvirate” served their purposes better than 
ordinary bargaining within EU institutions. At the same time, we do not assess if the decisions they 
pushed for were good or bad for the governance of the debt crisis, but we point to the fact that, as 
long as their liaison existed, it was rather effective in imposing its own agenda on such diverse 
matters as the Tobin tax, the super-commissioner for the Euro, the hair-cut on the Greek sovereign 
debt, the strengthening of fiscal governance, and others.3  
                                                 
 
3
 See respectively The Guardian, “Sarkozy and Merkel call for 'true economic government' to save Eurozone”, 16 
August 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/aug/16/sarkozy-merkel-economic-government-eurozone; 
Reuters, “Sarkozy and Merkel’s letter to Van Rompuy”, 07 December 2011,  
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/07/us-eurozone-france-letter-idUSTRE7B612Y20111207; Barroso, J.M. Durão, 
“Briefing on the conclusions of the European Council of 26/10/2011” 27 October 2011, 
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The so-called “Frankfurt group” is another informal institution that was very active towards the end 
of 2011 and throughout 2012, and whose decisions were crucial in reaching an agreement, among 
other things, on the second Greek bailout loan and on enlarging the capital guarantee of the 
European Financial Stability Facility (‘EFSF’). The name of the group comes from the fact that its 
members (Merkel, Sarkozy, ECB President Draghi, European Council President Van Rompuy, 
European Commission President Barroso, former Eurogroup President Juncker, International 
Monetary Fund (‘IMF’) President Lagarde) met for the first time in Frankfurt at a farewell party 
organized for former ECB president Trichet on 19 October 2011. The group had another meeting 
before the EU Council of 23-26 October and frequent meetings were reported during the G20 
summit in Cannes (3-4 November). During the G20,4 the Frankfurt group is reported to have 
discussed (and rejected) former Greek Prime Minister Papandreou’s proposal of holding a 
referendum on the bailout agreement signed at the end of October,5 and to have pushed Italy to 
accept IMF’s monitoring over the implementation of the fiscal austerity measures it had promised in 
August 2011.6 
 
As mentioned above, if IO theory is right, then decentralized institutions such as “Merkozy” and the 
“Frankfurt Group” should not have existed at all. More specifically, if international institutions 
(rules, organizations, or regimes like the EU, the Commission, the ECB, and the Eurogroup) were 
created to solve otherwise unsolvable problems of cooperation, including in the monetary realm, it 
would be ironic to assume that these solutions create their own problems of cooperation which 
command the creation of a new layer of international institutions. After all, there is no visible end to 
that sequence: the second layer of institutions may also create problems of cooperation, which may 
need a third layer of institutions, etc. So, if, as IO theory has it, centralized institutions are necessary 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/11/714; Der Spiegel, “Tough Words: Merkel and 
Sarkozy Halt Payments to Athens”, 3 November 2011, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/tough-words-merkel-
and-sarkozy-halt-payments-to-athens-a-795638.html. See generally, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (‘FAZ’), “Berlin 
und Paris übernehmen die Führung”, 2 December 2011, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/merkozy-berlin-und-
paris-uebernehmen-die-fuehrung-11549225.html.  
4
 Several sources report that at the G20 summit of November 2011 there were delegates wearing badges of the “Groupe 
de Francfort” (e.g. “A crisis? Call the F-team”, The Economist, 4 November 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2011/11/euros-frankfurt-group). 
5
 Der Spiegel online, “Tough Words: Merkel and Sarkozy Halt Payments to Athens”, 3 November 2011, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/tough-words-merkel-and-sarkozy-halt-payments-to-athens-a-795638.html. 
6
 La Repubblica, “Italia, sorveglianza rafforzata della Ue. Berlusconi: "Fmi è come certificazione bilancio"”, 4 
November 2011. http://www.repubblica.it/economia/2011/11/04/news/g20_ultimatum_italia-24390352. 
6For a very critical view on the anti-democratic nature of the Frankfurt Group, see The Huffington Post, “Merkel’s 
Chilling Vision of a Post-democratic Europe”, 27 January 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rory-fitzgerald/angela-
merkel-eu_b_1235889.html   
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and sufficient to minimize otherwise prohibitive transaction costs, why did such rational, 
experienced, and resourceful politicians as Merkel, Sarkozy, Juncker, or Draghi revert to de-
centralized bargaining?  
 
Even admitting that the decentralized institutions were created to alleviate problems created by their 
predecessors, a theory which claims that treaties are signed to solve problems created by other 
treaties which were themselves signed to solve problems of credible commitments fails in terms of 
both analytical traction and theoretical parsimony. In addition, note that by the time the 
decentralized institutions were created, Eurozone members were not only members of the EU 
(including the ECB and the Eurogroup), but also of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (‘OECD’), the World Bank, the IMF, the Bank for International Settlements, as well 
as of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, West European Union, and the 
Council of Europe, and they maintained close bilateral diplomatic relations. Their officials thus met, 
discussed, and monitored each other in several dozens forums on a daily basis, covering all relevant 
matters. According to IO theory, “above all, [such] institutions help states reach a collectively 
superior outcome by reducing the transaction costs of further international negotiations on specific 
issues and by providing the necessary information to reduce states’ uncertainty about each other’s 
future preferences and behaviour.” (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009: 72). It follows that, seen 
under the light of IO theory, the new decentralized institutions seem at best superfluous, and 
otherwise counter-productive. Yet, they were not innocuous pieces of monetary diplomacy between 
stable partners with identical positions. Rather, as we argued above, they came at a great political 
cost, both domestic and international. In the language of game theory, then, these were not part of 
“cheap talk” diplomacy; on the contrary, they sent a costly (and therefore credible) signal that the 
governments involved wished to go well beyond what their IO obligations imposed on them. 
Considering these costs, their creation is puzzling.       
 
Three possible, but ultimately unconvincing, answers to that puzzle include: (1) the possibility that 
these institutions were needed to coordinate on issues well beyond the remit of extant institutions; 
(2) the possibility that the new ad hoc institutions correspond to the transaction cost-economizing 
logic of full-blown integration; and (3) the possibility that they were actually substitutes to the EU, 
the ECB and the Eurogroup, in the sense that they were aimed to torpedo all efforts towards 
supranational integration by the extant institutions. Yet none of these explanations seems 
convincing in light of the empirical record.  
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The first one is not convincing because it assumes that the new ad hoc institutions… were not 
institutions in the end, but at most informal meetings of actors who happened to agree on some 
issues on the agenda in the organization they were part of. This is self-evident in the case of the 
Frankfurt group, for which there were no common institutions and there was no agenda (except the 
one the group itself set). On the other hand, also in the case of “Merkozy” we have shown that 
France and Germany did not agree to the same extent on all the proposals they made. In some cases, 
they advanced plans that were clearly pushed for by France, like the “Tobin tax”. In other 
occasions, France backed proposals that had been first put forward by Germany and other countries 
of the pro-austerity front (such as the Netherlands or Finland) – this happened with the “super 
commissioner” proposal. Finally, in other cases the two countries reached an agreement starting 
from very distant initial preferences (see the case of the EFSF “upgrade”). In other words, if 
everything France and Germany needed was coordination among countries with similar preferences 
in view of building consensus for their proposal in the Council, they would have found better allies 
in all of these issues. Occasional coalitions on various issues on the agenda happen all the time in 
EU politics. The way EU institutions are designed allows for discrete negotiations and diplomacy, 
and by no means requires sending costly signals that frustrate allies and potential allies. The facts 
prove that preserving the “duumvirate”, and showing that in fact it was something more than “cheap 
talk”, was more important than just coordinating on single topics. 
The second and third answer must also be rejected. Nothing leads to believe that “Merkozy” and the 
“Frankfurt group” were the prelude to further integration between the actors who took part in them. 
Not only this or similar outcomes never happened or were close to happen, but they were also never 
declared (implicitly or explicitly) or aimed for by the members of these institutions. Suffice it to 
mention that for France, participating in these institutions was rather part of a strategy to reaffirm its 
national sovereignty in foreign politics and to advocate an “intergovernmental Europe” (quoted in 
Dehousse 2011) not to delegate sovereignty to other supranational organizations. Similarly, it 
cannot be said that the new ad hoc institutions were meant to replace or dismantle the existing EU 
institutions. This is true for “Merkozy”, which always exerted its leadership within EU institutions 
and in order to steer their decisions, but also for the “Frankfurt group”, that was composed by the 
highest representatives of those existing institutions, that were in this way legitimizing and 
reinforcing each other. 
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5.	Decentralized	bargaining	and	the	coase	problem	
 
 To start building an alternative perspective on the place of the new ad hoc institutions in the 
logic of European monetary integration, this section revisits a possibility explicitly rejected in 
Keohane’s IO theory, namely that decentralized (i.e. non-formally institutionalized) bargaining 
among states may actually be as efficient, if not more efficient, than institutionalized cooperation. 
To do so, we first present Coase’s theorem of decentralized bargaining, then review Keohane’s 
argument against relying on that theorem, and finally discuss the merits and the limitations of 
Keohane’s critique. We conclude that the decentralized cooperation sustaining the new ad hoc 
institutions may actually have made more economic sense than what IO theory would predict.  
 
In his famous theorem, Coase argued that the existence of an external effect associated with a given 
activity did not inevitably require government intervention (Coase 1960). On the contrary, Pareto-
optimal solutions to such externality situations can often be worked out between the affected parties 
without the help of some central authority (“the government”). Moreover, the nature of the outcome 
is independent of the assignment of property rights. Accordingly, for example, an Italian or French 
policy which might produce adverse effects on Germany or Finland should be more efficiently dealt 
with in a direct, inter-governmental fashion than through the mediation of the Commission or the 
ECB. 
 
To see how the Coase theorem might work, consider a discrete case applied to Franco-German 
relations in the Eurozone. Let the French government be running a chronic fiscal deficit, thereby 
creating a debt problem which harms both German banks and the German public in general (e.g. 
French policies encourage southern debtor countries’ profligacy, lead to so-called hair-cuts, and 
weaken of the Euro, which Germans do not want). This has an electoral cost for the German 
Christian-Democratic government: given the French policy, it commands the support of only twelve 
million German voters, and this makes it potentially vulnerable to the Social Democratic Party. But, 
if the German Christian-Democratic government could make France limit its deficit and reign in 
that of southern debtor countries, it could project itself as a more efficient protector of German 
savers and consumers, and could therefore command the support of fourteen million German voters 
– which would do away with the Social-Democratic threat. On the other hand, French deficits bring 
in 500,000 votes to the French Gaullist government, which is in the context of French politics is 
important, too. So, should the French government be forced to eliminate its deficit, or should the 
German government have to fear electoral defeat? Is the solution dependent on the existence of an 
IO like the European Commission or the ECB?     
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Consider first what outcome is socially efficient. A social planner aiming at maximizing the utility 
of that group of politicians as a whole would compare the benefits that the French Gaullist 
government gets from running a deficit to the costs that the German Christian-Democratic 
government bears from it. If the benefits exceed the costs, it would be deemed efficient for the 
French Gaullist government to keep its externality-generating policy, and for the German Christian-
Democratic government to live with it – and vice versa. Further, according to the Coase theorem, 
inter-governmental negotiations between the two governments will reach the efficient outcome on 
their own, without the need for external intervention. In a first step, the German government can 
offer to pay the French government to eliminate the deficit. The latter will accept the deal if the 
policy the former offers yields more votes than the deficit does. If, for example, the French 
government would benefit by 800,000 votes from a more protectionist reform of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (‘CAP’) and an exclusion of cultural products from all international trade 
negotiations, then it might be tempted to indeed fight the deficit and accept the German 
government’s proposal for a new CAP and a protectionist trade policy for the culture sector.  
 
Crucially, by bargaining over the price of their deal, the two governments can always reach the 
efficient outcome without the need to set up a costly European Commission or an ECB. For 
instance, suppose again that the French government gets a 500,000 votes benefit from running a 
deficit and the German government bears a 2,000,000-votes cost from it. In this case, the latter can 
offer the former a policy p worth 500,000 ≤ p ≤ 2,000,000 to get rid of the subsidies. Assuming 
French factors of production can be costlessly redeployed, the former should accept, particularly if 
p > 550,000 or 600,000 (i.e. if the benefits are obvious). Hence, both parties are better off than they 
were before, and the efficient outcome is reached.  
 
It is possible, of course, that the German government would not be willing to offer any policy that 
the French government would accept. For instance, suppose that the French government gets a 
2,200,000-votes bonus from the subsidies and that the German government bears a 1,800,000-votes 
cost from them. In this case, the French government would turn down any offer of a policy which 
would yield less than 2,200,000 extra votes, while the German government would not offer 
anything yielding more than 1,800,000. Therefore, the French government would end up keeping 
the deficit. Given these political costs and benefits, however, this outcome too would be efficient. 
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Note finally that the result of efficient decentralized bargaining does not depend on the assumption 
that the French government has a legal right to implement a policy of deficits (which, under current 
rules, it does in the short-run). Although the distribution of such rights (e.g. the treaty rules on fiscal 
deficits and public debt) does ultimately affect the distribution of political well-being, it does not 
affect the parties’ capacity to reach the efficient outcome. For instance, suppose that the German 
government can legally compel its French counterpart to run a balanced budget. Although having 
this right works to the German government’s advantage, it probably will not change the outcome. In 
this case, the French government can offer to pay its German counterpart to allow it to run a deficit. 
If the benefit of that policy to the French government exceeds the costs it imposes on the German 
government, then the two governments will strike a bargain in which the French government keeps 
its policy.  
 
To be sure, the Coase theorem does not always hold, and inter-governmental solutions may not 
always work. In particular, the theorem applies only when the interested parties have no trouble 
reaching and enforcing an agreement. In the real world, however, bargaining does not always work, 
even when a mutually beneficial agreement in possible (e.g. Fearon 1995). According to Keohane,  
 
The Coase theorem has frequently been used to show the efficacy of 
bargaining without central authority, and it has occasionally been applied 
specifically to international relations. [It] could be interpreted, therefore, as 
predicting that problems of collective action could easily be overcome in 
international politics through bargaining and mutual adjustment. …  [But this 
fails because] Coase specified three crucial conditions for his conclusion to 
hold. These were: a legal framework establishing liability for actions, 
presumably supported by governmental authority; perfect information; and 
zero transaction costs (including organization costs and the costs of making 
side-payments). It is absolutely clear that none of these conditions is met in 
world politics. World government does not exist, making property rights and 
rules of legal liability fragile; information is extremely costly and often held 
unequally by different actors; transaction costs, including costs of 
organization and side-payments, are often high. Thus an inversion of the 
Coase theorem would seem more appropriate to our subject. In the absence 
of the conditions that Coase specified, coordination will often be thwarted by 
dilemmas of collective action (Keohane 1984: 87). 
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Keohane’s influential argument is not without merits. Nevertheless, at least two of its core points 
may carry less weight than it seems. First, there is no a priori reason to believe that information 
regarding partner states’ preferences and policies is as prohibitively expensive as argued in the 
quote above. As long as we focus on democratic states with a functioning parliament, press, and 
diplomatic corps, the cost of acquiring such information does not seem to be excessively higher for 
a foreign government than for the national government itself. (Note that this may not necessarily be 
true in business and economics, where the real-world relevance of the Coase theorem is rightly 
questioned; here, if a business firm has no legal obligation or strategic reason to make its future 
plans known publicly, acquiring that information may indeed be costly for outsiders.) In the context 
of France and Germany in the Eurozone, their common membership of the EU, the Elysée Treaty, 
the OECD, the IMF, the World Bank, and several defence organizations points to the opposite 
conclusion than Keohane’s.  
 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, Keohane’s definition of transaction costs is ambiguous, and 
their importance is exaggerated. His ambiguity stems from the “actorlessness” of his argument. The 
personification of states as players on the international arena allows Keohane to attribute to them 
calculations of transaction costs which (assuming they actually happen) are necessarily made by 
some sub-state actor. This may be a political party (e.g. the incumbent executive), a ministry (e.g. 
the ministry of foreign affairs), some more complex organization (e.g. a parliament), or even 
private-sector actors (e.g. peak business associations). Yet, each of these actors has its own utility 
function which may or may not include a negative term for transacting with foreign leaders. It 
follows that the cost of transacting with foreign states does not affect these actors in the same way. 
In short, what may seem to Keohane to be a very costly transaction from the point of view of states 
as a whole may not be one for specific decision-makers. For example, not only did President 
Sarkozy not avoid transacting with foreign leaders, but he strengthened the rule that European and 
foreign policies were his “domaine réservé”. (For a serious journalistic account of how politicians 
strive on rising transaction costs, see Paxman 2002.)  
 
Finally, Keohane almost certainly exaggerates the level of transaction costs. First and foremost, it is 
meaningless to talk about transaction costs without comparing them against production costs. In the 
economic theory of transaction costs, these occur where an agent seeks to economize on production 
costs (e.g. when a shoe manufacturer is unhappy for the price she has to pay for leather, and 
therefore decides to scan the market, spot a more competitive leather supplier, and negotiate a better 
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contract). Consequently, as long as economies in production costs are higher than the expense in 
transacting, the absolute value of the latter is irrelevant. Second, although transacting on an ad hoc 
basis certainly raises costs, transacting in an institutionalized environment is neither costless nor 
necessarily efficient either, since institutionalization gives partners a certain monopoly power. And 
finally, Keohane erroneously includes “costs of organization and side-payments”, which are 
production costs, and which occur under both decentralized and centralized mechanisms of 
governance, under the category of transaction costs. For example, to the extent that they form part 
of the final “price” paid in a transaction, side-payments occur even in transactions which are 
virtually frictionless. In fact, side-payments are, and have always been, routinely arranged in the 
EU, despite the highly centralized and institutionalized nature of these organizations. It follows that 
the real transaction costs of decentralized bargaining may actually be considerably lower than the 
productive efficiency of this mode of decision-making, and at any rate lower than speculated by 
Keohane. 
 
For all these reasons, decentralized bargaining between member states of the Eurozone may not be 
as irrational as IO theory would have it. Merkel, Sarkozy, Juncker, and others may thus have chosen 
to create new ad hoc institutions because of some efficiency unaccounted for by the theory. Can this 
possibility be incorporated into a theory of European integration, or a theory of delegation to IOs? 
We take up this challenge in the final substantive section below.  
 
 
6.	An	incomplete	contracts	theory	of	EU	institutions	
 
 This section presents the first steps towards a theory of European institutions which 
accommodates both supranational organizations such as the Commission and the ECB and inter-
governmental institutions such as the Elysée treaty and Merkozy, or mixed ones such as the 
Frankfurt Group. What we propose here does not intend to offer a substitute to IO theory, but to 
amend it in order to account for the new ad hoc institutions. Whereas IO theory answers relatively 
well why IOs are created, and correctly insists on the far-reaching implications of the fact that 
contracts between two or more states are never detailed enough to take into account all possible 
future contingencies, it does not offer much in terms of analyzing actual IO behaviour. To the extent 
that the new ad hoc institutions aimed precisely at correcting IO behaviour, the latter forms part of 
governments’ calculus, and should therefore be integrated into our theories of European integration 
and European institutions.    
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The theory proposed here can be summarized as follows. Two national governments seek to 
cooperate in a game with mixed motives, whereby (a) trading policies with each other produce 
certain gains, but (b) outperforming each other is an electorally valuable 
asset. Anticipating opportunistic behaviour from each other, these governments consider delegating 
powers to an international bureaucrat. Yet, contrary to the usual claim found in the literature, 
provided certain realistic conditions are met, this cannot possibly be an equilibrium institution, for 
the monopolistic power conferred on such a bureaucrat would allow her to discriminate between the 
two governments at the implementation stage. (This may be for different reasons, such as that 
discrimination reinforces the bureaucrat’s bargaining position in subsequent legislative rounds, or 
that she can profitably trade clemency in one policy dimension for support on other policy 
dimensions.) The two national governments will anticipate the negative effects of such 
discrimination and will either revert to a Cournot-like equilibrium of lower levels of cooperation, or 
will (i) design an international organization with internal checks and balances; and (ii) coordinate to 
learn each other's type before the bureaucrat can discriminate.  
 
Before giving more analytical explanations of the various steps of the theory, note preliminarily that 
the underlying assumptions are realistic and/or based on previous empirical findings. First, all 
players (i.e. the supranational bureaucrat, the national governments, and important opinion leaders 
within the two states) are rational, in the sense that they hold fixed and transitive preferences over 
all possible alternatives. Second, all players’ utility functions incorporate the implementation 
measure of each national administration (see Franchino 2007: 31). As in Keohane’s IO theory, 
member states “trade” policies. It follows that a member state X wants to sell its policy x to another 
member  state Y at the highest price possible (i.e. it wants to see Y implementing as much x as 
possible, while itself being forced to implement as little y − Y’s policy − as possible). Third, the 
trade between member states occurs before implementation (i.e. European treaty amendments and 
other package deals occur before implementation, so that member states “pay” before their policy 
gets implemented). Fourth, even though national governments may or may not exhibit a positive 
ideological predisposition towards further European integration, this is always conditional on 
maximizing their probability of re-election. Further, that probability is best served when a 
government is seen as outperforming its peers. Fifth, a unitary international bureaucrat may exhibit 
a positive ideological predisposition towards further European integration, but, if there is a conflict 
between that goal and maximizing its powers and discretion, the latter prevails.    
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In this theory, the starting point is that, to attract delegated power, the supranational bureaucrat 
needs to commit to non-discriminatory implementation. Whereas internal checks and balances can 
be of some help, their absence (i.e. where the bureaucrat is a unitary actor) prevents her from 
credibly committing to uniform implementation. First, to take a generic and substantively 
meaningless example, suppose two national governments, A and B, are interested in trading 
competition and gender equality policies. A may want to trade competition policy with B because it 
fears business firms in B’s country may enter horizontal and vertical agreements which foreclose 
their market to A’s exporters. Similarly, B may want to trade gender equality policy with A because 
it wants to eliminate the possibility that businesses in A’s country may be more competitive due to 
their paying female workers less. (Another, possibly more substantively meaningful, example might 
be a transaction involving supranational supervision of national budgets and euro-bonds.) Hence, 
from the point of view of the two governments, there may be scope for political gains π from trade. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that neither government would implement the other’s policy outside their 
trading relationship, they both make asset-specific investments (i.e. investments they would not 
have made were it not for their deal). Following Oliver Williamson’s theory of transaction cost 
economics, this renders them vulnerable to hold-ups (Williamson 1996).7 For example, A may 
suspect that, even if it grants women (costly) higher wages in its domestic economy, B will never 
implement A’s competition policy. Thus, one or both national governments anticipate opportunistic 
behaviour by the other. Following the mainstream logic of IO theory described in section 2 above, 
this leads them to delegate powers to a unitary international bureaucrat.  
 
But the story cannot possibly end there. As the vast literature on principal-agent models of EU 
politics attests, the bureaucrat’s incentives are not necessarily aligned with those of national 
governments. Suppose the redistributive effects of the two policies are well-known, and that there is 
agreement over the total value of the gains π. Given the terms of the trading agreement between A 
and B, the bureaucrat must then implement A’s competition policy both in A’s country and in B’s 
country, and B’s gender equality policy both in B’s country and in A’s country. If the bureaucrat 
promised to implement exactly A’s competition policy in both countries and exactly B’s gender 
equality policy in both countries (i.e. if she gave A and B exclusivity in the definition and 
implementation of their respective policies), then the two national governments would agree to 
                                                 
 
7
 It is also conceivable that country F has an intrinsic motivation to implement the policy of country D. (See, for 
example, Meseguer 2009 on policy diffusion.) In that case, if D incentivizes F to implement D’s policy, F will interpret 
the extrinsic incentives as a signal either about the difficulty of the task, or about F’s true type. Hence, extrinsic 
incentives may crowd out intrinsic ones in a self-defeating manner. (See Bénabou and Tirole 2003) This logic may have 
far-reaching, but as yet under-studied consequences for policies of conditionality, including outside the EU.    
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delegate powers p to the supranational level, up to the point where p = π. However, once she has 
taken the first implementing decisions in competition policy in A, the bureaucrat has an incentive to 
renege on her promise to apply a “pure” A-like policy, and to engage in opportunistic behaviour. 
She can now offer B preferential treatment, probably in the form of a deal whereby, in exchange for 
more lenience in the application of competition policy in B’s country, she receives B’s support for 
more delegation of powers to the supranational level. If she promises B she will only make such a 
proposal once, and B believes that, the bureaucrat would obtain up to an additional π/2 from B. By 
the same token, of course, A will have made a loss equal to π/2, since its business firms will not get 
access to B’s market. Once B’s support is cashed in, the bureaucrat could do the same with A over 
the implementation of gender equality wages.  
 
Of course, A and B should anticipate all this, and if the bureaucrat were unable to commit to non-
discriminatory implementation of policies, nobody would accept paying a specific price in 
exchange of highly uncertain benefits. Since national governments know that the bureaucrat has an 
incentive to renege on her promises, and that this will entail an electoral cost for them, the logical 
outcome is that there is no trade and no delegation to the supranational level. From a welfare point 
of view, this Cournot-like equilibrium may be good news for domestic democracy; however, it is 
bad news for all those who stood to gain from the transaction (including the prospective 
international bureaucrat herself). The only solution seems to consist in finding a way to make the 
bureaucrat’s commitments to non-discrimination credible.  
 
That is precisely what is achieved by designing the international bureaucrat not as a hierarchical 
unitary actor, but as a collegiate organization, such as the Commission or the ECB. Collegiality 
operates as an effective internal check against a bureaucrat who might be tempted to discriminate 
between member states. For, even though the treaties forbid commissioners from acting as 
representatives of their respective member states, any commissioner (or member of the ECB’s 
board) whose country of origin might be knowingly discriminated against would obviously trigger 
the alarm bell. This, we believe, is a first preliminary result of the theory proposed here: we finally 
have an explanation for the curious, administratively inefficient but politically crucial, structure of 
the Commission and the ECB.  
 
Unfortunately, however, collegiality is not a panacea − had it been one, there would be no reason 
for de Gaulle and Adenauer to negotiate and sign the Elysée treaty, or for Merkozy to seek to 
appoint a super-commissioner in charge of the Euro (see Karagiannis and Guidi 2013). In order to 
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be able to operate as an internal check and balance on potentially discriminating bureaucrats, 
members of the college must have (a) full information on each other’s important business, (b) the 
possibility to set the agenda, and (c) the possibility to vote by majority rule. Yet, these are precisely 
the attributes of systems which do not yield rational, stable outcomes. According to Arrow’s 
impossibility theorem, the preferences of the members of a voting body display a modicum of 
diversity, then majority voting need not generate a transitive ordering of the alternatives available 
for choice; rather, the alternatives cycle, even though individual preferences are coherent. Indeed, 
incoherence will often take the form of the non-existence of a collectively “best” alternative, and 
the final outcome will therefore be arbitrary (Hinich and Munger 1997: 95-99). It follows that 
neither the individual members of the voting body nor outside observers (in this case, national 
governments) can know the results before the occurrence of the vote. Thus, collegiality introduces 
an element of uncertainty which might have been too difficult for national governments to cope 
with, particularly in the context of the Eurozone crisis. That uncertainty, we submit, together with 
the risk of a “decision trap”, is what Merkel, Sarkozy, Juncker, and other European leaders aimed at 
limiting by creating the new ad hoc institutions. By committing to work towards reaching common 
positions before supranational bureaucrats brought them before a fait accompli, they made clear that 
the modicum of diversity necessary for the operation of Arrow’s theorem would not exist. 
 
 
7.		Conclusion	
 
 In this article we set out to offer a theoretical (as opposed to historical) explanation for the 
emergence of a host of new, ad hoc institutions which seemed to challenge the supranational nature 
of the European Union. That was a worthwhile exercise because, according to the currently 
dominant theory of international organizations, liberal institutionalism, existing centralized 
institutions should have been more efficient than the new ad hoc ones. It follows that either the 
latter are inefficient (and therefore their creators were rather unintelligent), or the theory is 
incomplete. Our goal was to investigate the latter possibility, not from a critical point of view, but 
from a constructive one.  
 
Despite the highly theoretical and systemic orientation taken here, the analysis has clear 
implications for how we think about (a) European integration, (b) the new ad hoc institutions, and 
(c) French and German European policies in the Euro era. In particular, we were able to show that, 
independently of whether international regimes economize on transaction costs and make 
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commitments credible, their institutional design matters, and probably does so to an even greater 
extent than liberal institutionalist authors argue. In the specific case at hand, it is not sufficient to 
argue that the Eurozone and its supranational Commission and ECB may have solved problems of 
credible commitments the way that, say, the World Trade Organization (‘WTO’) does in trade 
policy. For, unlike the WTO, the Commission and the ECB carry with them the in-built uncertainty 
of organs whose decision-making rule is majority rule with no restrictions on amendments. It 
follows that, although such institutions eliminate some kinds of uncertainty, they also generate new 
ones. 
 
In line with that social choice-theoretical reading of Eurozone institutions, we have argued that, if 
we want to understand exactly the raison d’être of the new ad hoc institutions, we first have to 
acknowledge that centralized supranational implementation can yield inefficient outcomes. Yet, this 
raises the question of why the EU centralized institutions (the Commission and the ECB) were 
designed that way. And, again, we have argued that this was a rational response to the very real 
problem of being discriminated against by international bureaucrats. Finally, an incomplete 
contracts theory of European integration solves the two puzzles simultaneously: the Commission 
and the ECB were created as potentially “chaotic” organizations (in the social choice-theoretic 
sense of the term) in order to limit bureaucratic discretion; and the costs that such a design created 
were then limited by the new ad hoc institutions. 
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The LUISS School of Government (SoG) is a graduate school training high-level public and private officials 
to handle political and government decision-making processes. It is committed to provide theoretical and 
hands-on skills of good government to the future heads of the legislative, governmental and administrative 
institutions, industry, special-interest associations, non-governmental groups, political parties, consultancy 
firms, public policy research institutions, foundations and public affairs institutions. 
The SoG provides its students with the skills needed to respond to current and future public policy 
challenges. While public policy was enclosed within the state throughout most of the last century, the same 
thing cannot be said for the new century. Public policy is now actively conducted outside and beyond the 
state. Not only in Europe but also around the world, states do not have total control over those public 
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